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Abstract. The increasing concerns of clients, particularly in online com-
merce, plus the impact of legislations on information security have com-
pelled companies to put more resources in information security. As a re-
sult, senior managers in many organizations are now expressing a much
greater interest in information security. However, the largest body of re-
search related to preventing breaches is technical, focusing on such issues
as encryption and access control. In contrast, research related to the eco-
nomic aspects of information security is small but rapidly growing. The
goal of this technical note is twofold: i) to provide the reader with an
structured overview of the economic approaches to information security
and ii) to identify potential research directions.
1 Introduction
Information security - the safeguarding of computer systems and the integrity,
confidentiality, and availability of the data they contain - has long been recog-
nized as a critical issue. Two current trends indicate that its importance is grow-
ing. First, the integration of computers into more and more aspects of modern
life continues. Second, cyber-attacks, or breaches of information security, appear
to be increasing in frequency, and few observers are willing to ignore the possi-
bility that future attacks could have much more severe consequences than what
has been observed to date.
The core issue, in both public and private sectors, is whether we devote
enough resources to information security or too much resources to information
security1. Part of the answer must come from economic analysis. What are the
costs, both historical and potential, of security breaches? How frequently can
attacks be expected? Can these factors be quantified precisely, so that business
firms and other organizations can determine the optimal amount to spend on
information security and measure the effectiveness of that spending?
This technical notes surveys the state of art on economic approach to informa-
tion security. First, we investigate whether organizations use economic analysis
for information security. Is it required to economically justify security expen-
diture? Why justify security expenditures? What caused the move to justify
security expenditure?
1 As stated by a security officer in a Fortune 500 company, ”you don’t want to secure
yourself out of business”.
X. Su,”An Overview of Economic Approaches to Information Security Management”, Technical Re-
port TR-CTIT-06-30, University of Twente, June 2006
Second, we look at what techniques have been used to justify security ex-
penditure. Much of the industry has begun to embrace the economic metrics to
validate the security department expenditures by expressing them in terms of
Return on Security Investment (ROSI), Net Present Value (NPV) and Internal
Return on Investment (IRR).
Third, we examine what topics have been addressed in the literature and
in practice. We categorize the studies in three topics: i) measuring the cost and
effect of security breaches, ii) measuring the benefit and effect of security control
and iii) determining the optimal level of security investment.
2 Why justify security expenditures?
2.1 The need for economic approaches
Information security expenditures are increasingly coming under greater and
greater scrutiny. Security departments are both struggling trying to manage the
risk associated with the e-commerce growth and fighting for their growing budget
needs. Gordon and Loeb comment in saying, ”To protect the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of information, while assuring authenticity and non
repudiation, organizations are investing large sums of money in IS activities.
Since security investments are competing for funds that could be used elsewhere,
it’s not surprising that CFO’s are demanding a rational economic approach to
such expenditures.” [20].
In todays security realm, security managers are forced to make a case for
the larger expenditures. A quote from an email of an information security officer
posted in the security focus mailing list illustrates the situation; ”I need to begin
putting together monthly reports for executive management (CEO) that show the
value that the information Security department is providing to the company. The
execs know what we do, my senior management feels we need to broadcast the
value InfoSec provides.”
2.2 What is the picture in practice?
In researching the question of the security fields perception we find that empir-
ical evidence shows that economic analysis (or cost benefit analysis) is a sound
basis for budgeting information security expenditures. In [22], The authors try
to find empirical answer to the question - ”Do firms use economic analysis in
deciding on planned expenditures for information security?” ”What are the key
factors driving and impeding the use of economic analysis by firms in decid-
ing on information security expenditures?” The survey concluded that senior
information security managers apparently do use some form of economic anal-
ysis in budgeting for information security. Their analysis shows that some of
the participants approach information security expenditures with a formal NPV
analysis, whereas other respondents approach these expenditures with a modified
economic analysis. The modified approach consists of examining the costs and
benefits of information security activities, but with less emphasis on formally
quantifying the benefits. Based on the responses to the open-ended questions,
there seems to be a movement toward using more economic analysis in evaluating
information security activities.
Another empirical study is the 2005 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security
Survey. It states ”A significant number of organizations conduct some form of
economic evaluation of their security expenditures, with 38 percent using Return
on Investment (ROI), 19 percent using Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and 18
percent using Net Present Value (NPV).” [24].
2.3 What caused the move?
Security is not a new concept. One might ask what has pushed upper man-
agement to require this kind of economic evaluation onto what was previously
considered just an operational cost. The importance of effective management of
information security has increased in recent years due to increasing frequency
and cost of security breaches. The US Treasury Department’s Office of Techni-
cal Assistance estimates cyber crime proceeds in 2004 were 105 billion dollars,
greater than those of illegal drug sales. According to the 2005 CSI/FBI Com-
puter Crime and Security Survey, nearly nine out of ten US businesses suffered
from a computer virus, spyware or other online attack in 2004 or 2005 despite
widespread use of security software. The total loss reported from 639 respon-
dents of the CSI/FEB survey for 2005 were over 130M dollars (203K dollars per
respondent). Public attention about security breaches increased dramatically
when companies like Amazon.com, Ebay and Yahoo! were hit by Denial-Of-
Service (DOS) attacks in February 2000. A number of high-profile computer
worms and viruses, such as code red, Nimda and I love you, also heightened the
awareness.
Another factor is a change in the way companies conduct business. E-commerce
has grown tremendously causing security departments to be creative in the meth-
ods of securing the organization while keeping in line with tightening budgets
and reduced profits. In trying to keep one step ahead of the current vulnerabili-
ties, they have been busy trying to secure new funds. Security is a fundamental
enabling technology of the Internet and attacks make it harder to do business on
the Internet. Return on Security Investment (ROSI) has become a controversial
topic due to immense growth of e-business [10].
Also, the literature sources indicate that, within the past few years, there
have been four major drivers setting directions to security decision makers in
organizations [17]:
– Government and industry-sector-specific regulations, for example the US
Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002
(better known as Sarbanes-Oxley), the Basel II Accord for international
banks, and the National Standards to Protect the Privacy of Personal Health
Information (HIPAA) for medical privacy.
– Standards, for example the ISO 17799 standard, and best practice models
for IT security such as ITIL and COBIT.
– Business risks and security requirements of the business network that an
organization has or wants to join. For many companies information security
is a qualifier to be in business, for example, big companies like Motorola, Ford
and General Motors require their partners or providers have appropriate
security practices.
– Urgency to invent opportunities in the midst of security breakdowns that
incur monetary damage, corporate liability, and loss of credibility.
When these factors are coupled together it becomes clear why the upper manage-
ment is requiring detailed explanation of how and why the security department
is spending funds.
In the past we have relied on fear, uncertainty, and doubt to qualify the
expenditures needed to secure an organization. A method coined as FUD in
the information security community. As we can see, these methods are gradually
fading into the past while economic measures are rising to the forefront. However,
it is rarely possible to use completely rational economic models of cost benefit
analysis (for example, the NPV model) in budgeting for information security.
Our interviews with the security officers in companies also show that for some
companies it is largely driven by such items as best practices in the industry,
or a must do approach; ”If the business decides to enter or stay in a certain
market, then you have to comply with the rules and regulations of that market.
Return on security investment doesn’t come into it; it’s a business decision to be
there, regardless of compliance costs.”
In sum, it is fair to say that in todays security realm, security must make
business sense for an organization. Today information security is shifting from
what is technically possible to what is economically efficient. Perfect security
does not exist, and even if it exists, it may very well be too expensive and not
worth it. Likewise, no security causes breaches that are too expensive, and com-
panies can not afford that. Each company should strike an appropriate balance
between risk and opportunity to reduce risk through security controls. What
is worth is adequate security at a reasonable cost, that provides the companies
ability to offer new services, to expand into new markets and to attract and
retain customers. Economic evaluation of security activity is needed to justify
the budget set for security projects; to assist in project appraisal and selection;
and to provide general input for the management of information security.
3 What techniques have been used?
According to the 2005 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, much of
the industry has begun to embrace the economic metrics to validate the security
department expenditures by expressing them in terms of ROI, NPV and IRR
[24]. We will describe them in turn.
3.1 ROSI
Return on security investment states the non-financial and financial benefits of
information security or an information security initiative compared to its costs.
Producing the result in financial terms indicates whether the quantifiable ben-
efits offered or delivered outweigh the costs. The main drivers for using ROSI
are: to justify the budget set for security projects; to assist in project appraisal
and selection; and to provide general input for the management of information
security. There are two groups of people driving the use of ROSI. One group,
driving use from the top down, includes senior management, academics and fi-
nance professionals; the other group, driving use from the bottom up, are security
professionals. Both groups wish to have a clear view of the value and benefits of
any security investment.
ROSI refers to the calculation of the financial return from an investment in
security, such as an initiative or project, based on the financial benefits and costs
of that investment. ROSI is expressed as the net gain divided by the investment.
In the simplest of terms:
(what−I−gained− totally)− (what−I− invested)/(what−I− invested) (1)
What a company invest is considered tangible or hard assets. A valid number
can be generated relatively easily. The problem lies in determining a number for
what is gained. Firewalls simply do not generate revenue, IDS do not generate
revenue. The difficulty heres lies in the fact that security is a negative goal. As
illustrated by a security office; ”What do you provide to your executives. It is
tough to show the value of what you do when that value consists of potentially
making something not happen (security incident).” So how do we decide gain to
the avoidance of security incident or controlling the impact of a security inci-
dent? Early attempts to measure security risk led to the annual loss expectancy
(ALE) model, developed in the late 1970s at the National Institute for Standards
and Technology (NIST) [37]. ALE is a dollar figure, produced by multiplying the
impact of an incident (in dollars) by the frequency (or probability) of the ac-
cident. In other words, ALE considers security breaches from two perspectives:
how much damage would such a breach incur, and how likely is it to occur?
ALE combines probability and severity of attacks into a single number, which
represents the amount a firm actually expect to lose in a given year.
ALE =
n∑
i=1
I(Oi)Fi (2)
where:
{O1, . . . , On}= Set of harmful outcomes
I(Oi)= Impact of outcome in dollars
Fi= Frequency of outcome i
Using ALE, the calculation of risk reduction related to a particular security
control, boils down to the calculation of differences of ALE before and after
implementing the security control. That difference can be seen as the benefit of
implementing the security control in question.
what−i−gained = benefit = ΔALE = ALEwithout sec control−ALEwith sec control
(3)
Still the estimation of risk mitigation can be subjective. E.g. how to estimate a
security breachs collateral damage, including litigation fees,fines for information
disclosure, and harm to the companys overall image and brand [32]. Some in the
information community consider this as a problem in examining soft and hard
dollars. The soft dollars being the assignment of gain to the above mentioned
attributes of risk mitigation, reputation and so forth. ”This issue of soft versus
hard benefits does not invalidate the security business case, but it does make
it unique. While almost all business cases include both hard and soft benefits,
most of the important benefits with security business cases are soft.”[32].
3.2 NPV
In addition to the subjective downside of ROSI, the time attribute presents
a problem and leads managers to use Net Present Value (NPV) along with
ROI to justify security expenditures. NPV is very useful in evaluating between
alternatives. The methodology behind NPV is to find the cash flows generated by
a particular solution and find what those cash flows are worth in todays dollars.
Present Value (NPV) is the most widely accepted criterion for project evalua-
tion in corporate finance [7]. A project with a positive NPV increases the wealth
of the firm, that is, the total value generated through the project’s lifetime is
superior to the cost of financing it. NPV is measured in today’s dollars. Its com-
putation is based on the principle of discounting: all projected future cash flows
of the project are discounted back to the present time under the assumption
that one dollar today is worth (1+ d)T dollars at time T in the future. The cash
flows represent the estimated costs, cost savings, and revenues at various points
during the useful lifetime of the project. A higher NPV is always preferable to
a lower NPV, and a negative NPV represents an unacceptable investment.
3.3 IRR
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is the final economic metric discussed that a secu-
rity manager might use to evaluate a project expenditure. The IRR is calculated
by using a cash flow like NPV. Unlike the NPV calculation IRR will show a
security manager at what rate will we break even.
4 What topics have been addressed?
The largest body of research related to preventing breaches is technical, focus-
ing on such concerns as encryption and access controls. In contrast, the research
related to the economic aspects of information security is small but rapidly
growing [1, 4, 21, 23, 11, 25, 29, 31, 8]. Researchers have addressed various secu-
rity issues from an economics perspective, ranging from studies measuring the
cost of security breaches and the benefit of security controls to studies aiming
at determining how much to invest in security and how to design an effective
security architecture. We will group them in topics and address each group in
turn.
4.1 Measuring the cost of security breaches (business impact
analysis)
The true cost of a security breach is multi-faceted and difficult to quantify. The
loss can be direct or indirect. The business impact of a security breach can be
classified into the following categories [27]:
– financial impact
• a) loss of sales, orders or contracts
• b) loss of tangible assets
• c) penalties/legal liabilities
• d) unforeseen costs
• e) depressed share price
– Operational impact
• a) loss of management control
• b) loss of competitiveness
• c) new ventures held up
• d) breach of operating standards
– Customer-related impact
• a) delayed deliveries to customers or clients
• b) loss of customers or clients
• c) loss of confidence by key institutions
• d) damage to reputation
– Employee-related impact
• a) reduction in staff morale/productivity
• b) injury or death
The above impacts can be tangible and intangible. It is possible to estimate
some of the above costs such as lost of sales, material and labor costs, and loss
of productivity. Other costs such as those related to damage to reputation and
loss of confidence are difficult to calculate. Nonetheless these costs are extremely
important in measuring the true cost of security for business.
Valuing information assets for security risk management. Firms can’t
fully quantify the loss if they have not valued the resource. As pointed out by
Crume [16] ”The first rule of IT security is that you should never spend more to
protect something than that thing is actually worth.” Consequently, the money
you spend on a security control should not exceed the value of the information
assets the security control protects. Valuing information for this purpose differs
significantly from valuing information for accounting purposes. In most cases,
the organization is not trying to sell its data to others and has not established
a marketplace in which the data’s value could be tested.
Poore reported that one or more of the following conditions generally forms
the basis for valuing information for risk management purposes [33]:
– Exclusive possession. The degree to which information is exclusively pos-
sessed directly relates to the value the information has to the organization
that possesses it. For example, a trade secret that ceases to be a secret loses
value.
– Utility. Information that is useful is at least as valuable as the use to which it
can be put. Destruction of information or denial of access to information that
results in an enterprise becoming disabled demonstrates the utility of the
information b proving that it is essential to the operation of the enterprise.
– Cost of creation or re-creation. One of the easiest and most conservative
methods of capturing a value for an entity is to determine how much it cost
the enterprise to create or to acquire the information in the first place.
– Liability. When information represents a relationship of trust (e.g. because
of its personal or private nature, trade secrecy, or national security impli-
cations), then the possessor of the information may assume liability for its
protection2.
– Convertibility. When information represents value intrinsically, (e.g. an elec-
tronic funds transfer or an inventory count), or when information has intrin-
sic value, (e.g., intellectual property, music) potentially convertible to other
assets, the information valuation would be at least equal to the conversion
value.
– Operational impact. An organization can often assign value on the basis
of the impact the absence of the data would have on the organization or
the impact that incorrect or untimely date have on the organization. For
example, an invalid inventory could cause over or under ordering of materials.
Different valuation methods Different valuation methods have been devel-
oped in recent years [31, 34, 9, 25, 19, 12]. These methods produce dissimilar val-
ues for the same assets. Some approach look at the costs of creating/re-creating
the compromised assets, others examine costs incurred as a result of the security
breach, while still others try to capture all effects on both revenues and costs.
Further Hoo argues that to value the consequences of security breaches, a com-
parison could be done between two possible scenarios: one in which a security
2 Liability is additionally complicated as an element of information valuation because
of it is extremely probabilistic in nature. That is, the breach of trust or other ac-
tionable tort must occur, a third party must be harmed, and steps must be taken by
the third party to extract compensation from the enterprise. Until this process has
actually resulted in expenses to the enterprise, the existence of a theoretical liability
does not admit to practical quantification. Nonetheless reasonable valuations based
on case histories in which data of similar nature resulted in harm and in the award
of damage may prove useful in supporting information security risk management
decisions.
incident occurs and one in which it does not occur [25]. The differences between
the two scenarios would form a basis for valuing the consequences. For example,
if a manufacturer’s order-taking system suffered a one-week outage, the value
lost should not be an entire week’s revenues just because the system was unable
to take orders. Orders will likely still be taken and processed by some alter-
native, albeit probably less efficient, method. The cost of the consequences is,
therefor, more appropriately computed by comparing the revenues that would
have resulted if the system had been operational against the revenues actually
realized.
Some organizations have relied on the cost estimates from the CSI/FBI Sur-
vey. According to the CSI/FBI Survey 2005, which polled 699 respondents from
organizations throughout the United Stated, 639 were able and willing to quan-
tify the losses. Respondents estimates of the losses caused by type of computer
security incident are shown in figure 1. The total reported loss was over 130M
dollars and the average estimated loss was over 230K dollars per organization
across all types of breaches. Figure 1 shows that the top three categories of
lossesi.e., from viruses, unauthorized access and theft of proprietary informa-
tionswamped the losses from all other categories. The denial of service category
is a distant fourth. According to the authors, the reported losses include largely
only the direct and tangible costs associated with security breaches. The authors
suspect that respondents are more accurate than ever in accounting for their ex-
plicit costs (such as the cost of reinstalling software and reconfiguring computer
systems). But theyre equally suspicious that implicit losses (such as the lost
future sales due to negative media coverage following a breach) are largely not
represented in the loss numbers reported here [24].
These implicit costs are difficult to measure, although some researcher pro-
pose to capture the implicit costs through the loss of market capitalization a pub-
licly traded company may experience. Cavusoglu proposes a market valuation-
based approach to estimate the true cost of security breaches [12]. There ap-
proach is based on efficient market hypothesis. In efficient markets, investors
are believed to revise their expectations based on new information in announce-
ments. Investors’ expectations are reflected in the value of the firm. Security
problems may signal to the market a lack of concern for customer privacy or
poor security practices within the firm. These signals in turn may lead investors
to question the long-term performance of the firm. In investors view a security
breach negatively, believing that the transitory and long-term costs resulting
from the breach will substantially reduce expected future cash flows, then using
the change in market value of the breached firms around security breach an-
nouncement days can be a proxy to estimate the rue cost of security breaches.
Studies in the same line of research include works from [9].
Difficulty in the valuation of security damage Placing a value on the dam-
age caused by a breach of information security is a highly speculative activity.
Some of the costs associated with information assets are readily assessable, such
as resources devoted to information recovery, others are not so easily quanti-
Fig. 1. Financial Losses according to the CSI/FBI Survey.
fied. For example, the value of an information asset is highly dependent on who
possesses the information. Time sensitivity can also complicate the valuation
problem. For example, a password that expires after ten seconds is worthless
after it has expired. Add to the difficulties is the challenge posed by intangible
values, such as reputation, trust, embarrassment, etc. and the task of valuation
quickly becomes a highly uncertain activity.
4.2 Measuring the value of security controls/safeguards
Ideally, safeguard selection would be based on a balancing of cost and effective-
ness. The specific capital, installation, and maintenance costs of safeguards can
be readily estimated from a host of vendors. These vendors offer a full range of
security services from basic security technology to implementation of security
solutions to the complete management of information security 3.
3 Quantification of the full impact that security controls may have on an organization,
especially measures that require changes in worker behavior and in their access
to information, is not as easily calculable. Further, security almost always comes
at the cost of convenience, hence hampering productivity. The cost of a safeguard
In contrast, the measurement of safeguard efficacy remains primitive in a
very few cases and elusive in the rest. Rating processes do exist for some spe-
cific technologies, such as firewall, anti-virus software, and intrusion detection
systems. However, these ratings are neither comparable across technologies nor
applicable in an information security risk assessment context. At present, no
formal methodology exists for rating the security of one computer against the
security of another. The difficulty of the measurement problem derives from two
inherently uncertain quantities: prediction of the attack profile and estimation
of security policy compliance. Both factors depend upon humans who have a
diverse range of incentives and upon technology that is constantly changing.
The effectiveness of a safeguard is an assessment of how well the safeguard
mitigates a risk. A safeguard can mitigate risk in two ways: prevent an attack
from occurring or reduce the consequence of a successful attack. Safeguards re-
duce the consequence of an attack because security managers detect an attack,
which gives them an opportunity to either stop an ongoing attack or identify the
damage. Security technologies fail for a variety of reasons so security experts rec-
ommend using more than one safeguards against expected threats. This security
engineering principle is known as defense-in-depth [2]. Using the defense-in-depth
model, security control can be classified as protection, detection, or recovery
mechanisms. Since prevention mechanisms stop a threat from succeeding, they
reduce threat frequencies. Detection and recovery mechanisms reduce the attack
outcomes from a compromised system. To assess the effectiveness of safeguards
can be difficult and controversial. If available, past incident data should be an-
alyzed to derive the reduction factors. Otherwise, expert judgments would be
used to estimate the efficacy rate. In [8], the author uses security manager’s sub-
jective judgment to quantify the effectiveness and argues that although security
managers recognize that precise effectiveness metrics are unobtainable, they are
able to provide rough estimates. Furthermore, the authors reasons that when
better estimation are not available, a rational approach is to conduct sensitivity
analysis to understand how sensitive the decisions are to the security manager’s
assumptions and estimates.
Given the fact that a defense-in-depth security architecture is a necessity for
a secure environment, the crucial question to answer is how security controls
interact with each other. Do they complement each other, for example, is the
effectiveness of a security architecture with both a firewall and an IDS greater
than the sum of the effectiveness when each controls is applied individually? The
point is that firms should carefully evaluate the value of a security mechanism
considering already existing controls before concluding on its return instead of
isolation from existing controls.
should also include the impact of the safeguard on productivity, since this number
is sometimes significant enough to make or break the viability of a given solution.
4.3 Determine the optimal level of security investment (the decision
framework)
The task of determining the optimal level of security investment utilizes results
in the previous two sections. We identify a number of approaches and group
them in three groups.
Decision analysis framework This line of work uses the traditional risk or
decision analysis framework. The idea is to identify the potential risk of security
breaches in terms of their damages and likelihood. Gordon and Loeb provide
an economic modeling framework for assessing the optimal amount to invest in
information security based on the principle of equating the marginal financial
benefits of information security to the marginal financial costs of such security
[21]. Hoo provides a decision analytical framework to evaluate different policies
for IT security [25]. He develops a risk modeling framework for selection of safe-
guards which utilizes influence diagrams as a common graphical language that
maps relationships between key variables. In stead of comparing security con-
trols on an individual basis, his model groups controls into baskets of safeguards,
or policies4. Then he makes the cost benefit trade off analysis for each policy.
Longstaff et al. proposes Hierarchical Holographic Model (HHM) to assess secu-
rity risks and provide a model for assessing the efficacy of risk management [30].
Bodin et al. propose to use Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) for assisting an
organization in making information security investment decisions [4].Their ap-
proach offer the advantage of analyzing multi-criteria decision scenarios, where
financial and non financial, quantitative and qualitative criteria are compared.
Butler proposes a cost benefit analysis method called SAEM to compare alter-
native security designs [8]. The case study presented in this paper starts with
a multi-attribute risk assessment that results in a prioritized list of risks. Secu-
rity specialists estimate safeguards benefits and how the organizations’ risks are
reduced. Using SAEM, security design alternatives are compared with organi-
zation’s current selection of security technologies to see if a more cost-efficient
solution is possible. Xie and Mead describe a general framework for hierarchical
cost/benefit analysis aimed at providing acceptable estimations for small com-
panies in their information security improvement projects [38]. The framework
classifies misuse cases into categories of threats for which nationally surveyed
risks and financial data are publicly available. For each category of threats,
costs, benefits, baseline risks, and residual risks are estimated. The framework
then generates all permutations of possible solutions and analyzes the most op-
timal approach to maximize the value of security improvement projects.
Game theory Cavusoglu et al. argue that the traditional decision analysis
approach for evaluation IT security investment, though intuitive, treats security
4 He does not consider the interactions between safeguards when grouping them to-
gether
technology as a black box and do not take into account that the context of IT se-
curity is different from other general IT investment context [11]. They argue that
in security, organizations are dealing with strategic adversaries who are looking
for opportunities to exploit vulnerabilities in systems. Therefore, IT security can
be treated as a kind of game between organizations and attackers. Game theory
[35] is used to analyze problems in which the payoffs to players depend on the
interaction between players’ strategies. In the security investment problem, the
firm’s payoff from security investment depends on the extent of hacking it is
subjected to. The hacker’s payoff from hiking depends on the likelihood of being
caught. Security investment not only prevent security breaches by reducing the
vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit but also act as a deterrent for attackers
by making attacks less attractive. Knowing that their attack will not be enough
to bypass preventive security mechanisms or will be detected by detective con-
trol mechanisms can change the behavior of attachers. Based on the above idea,
Cavusoglu et al. use a game theory based approach for determining the optimal
IT security investment level. In the same line is the work of Cremonini and Mar-
tini. They propose an approach to improve ROI-based evaluation by integrating
them with a new index, called Return-On-Attacks (ROA), aimed at measuring
the convenience of attacks [15].
Real options theory Real Options Analysis was first developed as a deci-
sion support technique in the area of capital investment [13].The concept of real
means adapting mathematical models used to evaluate financial options to more
tangible investments. This approach reconciles financial and strategic viewpoints
to support decision making in the face of uncertainty - in particular, for valu-
ing flexibility. The core of real options analysis for IT assets consists of: i) the
identification and the assessment option components in a project and ii)the se-
lection and the application of a mathematical model for valuing financial options
that serves to quantify the current value of choosing these components for in-
clusion at a later time. Real options theory has been applied in several area in
information systems and software engineering research, e.g. software reuse [18]
and stability of software architecture [3]. In information security, attempts have
been made to use real options to explain or guide security investment decisions.
Gordon et al. explain why a large portion of security expenditures seem to be
made on a wait-and-see basis even though expenditures to prevent information
security breaches have been growing rapidly in recent year [23]. They argue that
one key driver of actual expenditures on information security activities is the
occurrence of actual security breaches. They further explain that this reactive,
as opposed to proactive, approach toward a significant portion of information
security expenditures is consistent with the real options view of capital invest-
ments. Daneva proposes a real options-based decision framework for information
security [17]. She identifies a number of options and argues that these options
embed flexibility in the decision making process.
4.4 Relevant studies in a broader scope
It is worthwhile to note that even security technology developers have started
to incorporate cost and benefit factors in algorithms used by the technology.
For example, Lee et al. study the problem of building cost sensitive intrusion
detection systems (IDS) [28]. They use the cost model and technical effectiveness
of the IDS to determine whether it is worthwhile to employ countermeasures to
stop an intrusion. Conrad used Monte-Carlo simulation to capture uncertainty
in security modeling parameters (vulnerabilities, frequency of intrusion, damage
estimates, etc) and expresses its impact on the model’s forcast (e.g. projected
benefit) [14]. A Monte-Carlo simulation enables an analyst to quantify the uncer-
tainty in an expert’s estimate by defining it as a probability distribution rather
than just a single expected value. A highly related topic is software economics,
or value-based software engineering . An increasing number of research has been
directed to software economics, the study of economic aspects of software. Barry
Boehm wrote a comprehensive reference on software engineering economics [6]
which, along with the book on cost estimation [5], provides a solid foundation
for understanding ROI in the software context.
5 Conclusions and future work
Bruce Schneier, in his book - Beyond Fear: Think Sensibly about Security in
an Uncertain World - explains how security really works, ’The key is to think
of security not in absolutes, but in terms of sensible trade-offs, whether on a
personal or global scale.’ He also adds, ’Economics - not technology - determines
what security technologies get used.’ [36]. The overview of literature in this paper
echoes his remarks.
In this paper, we gave an overview of the literature on economic approaches
to information security management. We discussed a number of issues: i)the
need to justify security expenditures, ii)what techniques have been used, and
iii) what topics have been addressed in literature. There are several directions
for future research on economic aspects of information security management.
One prominent line of research is to extend and adapt the current practice into
cross-organizational security processes and services, where each unit are profit-
loss responsible for itself. It poses challenges both at technical level and orga-
nizational level. To make informed decisions on security budgets and resource
allocation, at network business level, the partners have to define what shared
information responsibilities partners have to each other. They have to determine
who pays for security, who suffers in case of failure, who is liable should security
be comprised [1]. When multiple organizations or individuals collaborate, they
may share risks and revenues, leading to a need for common business cases and
an equitable distribution of costs. Networked business will be difficult to func-
tion if the organizations involved cannot agree: why security is necessary; the
scope it should cover and what each organization expects it to achieve. It will
be difficult to manage if failures to achieve agreed security levels are difficult to
detect and enforce.
Estimating costs and benefits of security solutions involves a high degree of
uncertainty. How to incorporate uncertainty in the decision framework requires
further research. Prominent line of work including using Bayesian belief networks
(BBN) for cost-benefit trade-off analysis of security treatment strategies [26] and
applying Real Options thinking to information security [17].
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